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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of public pension plan risk-taking behavior 
using the percentage of total plan assets invested in the equity markets and the pension 
asset beta as measures of investment risk. We find that government accounting standards 
strongly affect public fund investment risk, as higher return assumptions (used to 
discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and beta. Unlike 
private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have 
lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer 
hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing financial constraints allocate 
more assets to equity and have higher pension asset betas. There also appears to be a 
herding effect in that a change in CalPERS portfolio beta or equity allocation is 
mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, the results offer mild support of a public union 
effect. 
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An Analysis of Risk-Taking Behavior for Public Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
 
1. Introduction 
Public pension plans play an important role in the financial market. By 2008, their 
investments exceeded 6 percent of total financial assets, with aggregate assets of more 
than $2.5 trillion.1 These plans, which are mostly defined benefit (DB) plans, cover 
pension benefits for 12.8 million active public employees and 5.9 million retirees and 
other annuitants.2  Despite their size, the plans appear to be underfunded. The Pew Center 
on the States reports a $1.26 trillion shortfall for the fiscal year ending in 2009, a 26 
percent increase from the prior year.3  Other researchers argue for more conservative 
accounting of promised benefits, which could further raise the shortfall estimate.  Novy-
Marx and Rauh (2010) suggest that the dollar value gap of “already promised” benefits 
over asset value is between $1.27 and $3.26 trillion.  This means that each tax-paying 
household would need to contribute an additional $21,500 to fully fund the obligation 
(Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009).4
The severe funding gap prompts questions of why the underfunding occurred and 
whether the pension fund administrators will adopt riskier investment positions in the 
hope of raising returns and lowering the shortfall. In this study we provide some 
explanation for the first question; however, we focus our research on risk-taking 
behavior. In particular, using data from the Public Plans Database maintained by the 
 Rauh (2010) estimates that the existing unfunded pension 
debt would exhaust assets, in aggregate, by the year 2028. However, several funds would 
run out much sooner. For example, Illinois would run out of pension fund assets in 2018, 
and during the next year Connecticut, Indiana, and New Jersey would follow suit (Rauh 
2010). The effect of underfunded pensions touches a large percentage of the population, 
including not only those at risk but also the taxpayers who may be called upon to close 
the funding gap.  
                                                 
1 The numbers are from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release Flow of Funds Accounts of the United 
States dated September 17, 2009, put out by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, D.C. 
2 Source: The National Association of State Retirement Administration’s Web site, http://www.nasra.org. 
3 “The Widening Gap: The Great Recession’s Impact on State Pension and Retiree Health Care Costs,” 
April 2011, available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Pew_pensions_ 
retiree_benefits.pdf. The figure cited includes both pension and health care costs. 
4 The $21,500 figure is calculated by using the number of households filing tax returns for 2008 (Novy-
Marx and Rauh 2009). 
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Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, we investigate the determinants of 
pension risk-taking behavior during the period 2001 through 2009 after taking into 
consideration state government incentives, political pressure, fiscal constraints, and 
workforce features. Our measures of investment risk include the percentage of total plan 
assets invested in the equity markets and the pension plan asset beta (Jin, Merton, and 
Bodie 2006). We offer evidence that government accounting standards strongly affect 
risk-taking behavior, as most pension plans use higher return assumptions to discount 
their pension liabilities. Unlike reported results for private pension plans (Rauh 2009), 
results for public pension plans indicate public fund managers appear to take on more risk 
if the plans are already underfunded and have had low investment returns in the previous 
years, behavior consistent with risk-transfer or an intent to pass underfunded current 
pension obligations on to future tax payers (Gold 2003). Similarly, there is some 
evidence to support the hypothesis that state fiscal constraints are associated with higher 
levels of pension fund risk.  There also appears to be a herding effect in that plan 
managers tend to follow the risk-investing behavior of CalPERS (California Public 
Employees' Retirement System).  Furthermore, the results offer mild support of a public 
union effect—that is, in order to provide larger retirement benefits for unionized public 
employees, the fund manager pursues a riskier investment allocation. Finally, we find 
limited evidence that economically targeted investment policies are associated with lower 
pension investment risk.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the 
institutional background, providing a quick example of a DB plan and commenting on 
government accounting standards.  A literature review and presentation of hypotheses is 
provided in Section 3.  We summarize the data and empirical results in Section 4, and 
offer conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Institutional background 
2.1. Example of defined benefit pension plan mechanics 
To better understand the underfunding status of public pension funds, we first 
provide a quick review of DB plan benefit mechanics. Typically, the retirement benefit is 
a function of salary, years of service, and a benefit factor. For example, consider a DB 
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plan for teachers in which the benefit factor is 2.2 percent.  Suppose a teacher retires after 
30 years, at a peak salary of $70,000, and earns a retirement benefit of $46,200 (0.022 × 
30 × 70,000), with the duration of payments as the only unknown.  State funding of this 
retirement is considered to be a cost, or a part of the employee’s compensation. Thus, 
each year the state recognizes the cost of employee benefits accrued (earned). Usually, 
both employees and employers fund the pension obligations, so the state is partially 
paying for the retirement obligation.  In Ohio, for example, members of the State 
Teachers Retirement System (STRS) Fund contribute 10 percent of gross earnings to the 
trust fund, while employers contribute an additional 14 percent. These contributions, plus 
earnings from their investment during the employee’s working life, flow into the fund.   
Returning to the example above, if a teacher starts with a starting salary of $34,206 and 
receives annual raises of 2.5 percent, the lifetime contributions amount to $360,416.  The 
undiscounted value of retirement benefits (assuming the same 2.5 percent inflation and 
30 years postretirement) is just over $2 million. The most recent five-year return for the 
Ohio STRS was 2.69 percent; using this return for both investing and discounting 
obligations provides a liability of more than $1.3 million, with invested assets of 
$518,000 at the time of retirement. Clearly, the rate of return on investment and the 
appropriate discount rate to apply to forecasted benefits are key actuarial assumptions. 
2.2. Pension effects from government accounting standards 
From an accounting perspective, states are required to follow the guidelines 
specified in Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 25 (GASB 25), 
which “stipulates that states should make annual required contributions (ARC) to include 
the cost of newly accrued benefits due to service and wage increases, amortized payments 
to make up unfunded actual liabilities, and amortized payments to make up any actuarial 
loss” (GASB 1994).5
                                                 
5 See, for example, Rauh (2010, p. 12).   
 However, states do not always contribute sufficient funds to cover 
the amortized unfunded liabilities and/or actuarial loss.  According to the Pew Center on 
the States, only 22 states fully funded their 2009 fiscal year pension obligations. 
Although the average contribution of all states exceeded 90 percent, many states 
contributed a small portion of the required contribution—e.g., 31 percent for 
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Pennsylvania.6
Finally, GASB accounting standards have contributed to the problem on the 
liability side. According to GASB 25, liabilities (retiree benefits) may be discounted at a 
rate equal to the expected return on assets. Most plans assume 8 percent.
  More states may experience difficulty meeting the required contribution 
as the current level of underfunding increases the amortization burden part of the ARC. 
Thus, a second problem is the states’ current inability to devote more of the budget 
towards amortizing the underfunding.  
7  Lower 
valuations for pension cost require lower ARCs.  Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) believe 
that the inappropriate matching of the expected return on the investment strategy to the 
certainty of paying benefits is responsible for the current underfunding crisis.  Stated 
another way, stocks are risky, and although the long-term return is a historical 11.4 
percent, there have been several periods of negative returns. The current financial crisis 
deepened the deficit for state public employee DB plans; however, underfunding was 
already a prevalent issue in 2005, when Wilshire Research reported two problems: 1) 94 
percent of state retirement systems were underfunded and 2) average asset allocations 
were skewed towards equity (67 percent equity, including real estate and private equity, 
and 33 percent fixed income). GASB 25 thus provides an incentive that results in 
underfunding and exposing the assets to high levels of market risk in order to minimize 
the service costs.8
In summary, academic researchers and industry practitioners are alerting the 
public to the magnitude of the pension plan underfunding problem and are suggesting 
various contributory causes.
 
9 Indeed, it appears that accounting and political influence 
may provide managers with an incentive to allocate more funds to riskier assets.10 
Anecdotal evidence from CalSTRS and CalPERS appear to support this projection.11
                                                 
6 These statistics are available on the center’s Web site: http://
   
www.pewcenteronthestates.org. 
7  This is from an asset allocation target of 60 percent equity, earning 11.4 percent, and 40 percent debt, 
earning 3 percent. The weighted average of returns is about 8 percent (GASB 1994).  
8 Although the ARC requires a payment for underfunding, the amount of underfunding is subject to an 
amortization period of 30 years.   
9 Other contributory factors, outside the scope of this research, include ill-timed benefit increases following 
the large fund returns during the 1990s, and structural issues such as spiking pay or early retirement. See 
The Trillion Dollar Gap:  Underfunded State Retirement Systems and the Road to Reform, February 18, 
2010, Pew Center on the States. 
10 Munnell, Haverstick, Sass, and Aubry (2008) argue that because public funds use the “entry-age normal” 
cost method, which front-loads pension expense, underfunding is not as severe as indicated by the media. 
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3. Literature review and hypotheses 
There is a rich history of research concerning private pension plans; however, 
empirical study of public pension plans is more limited.  This is due to data availability 
problems as well as to the different orientation of issues.  For example, the corporate 
sponsor of private plans has to answer to shareholders and must comply with or follow 
strict regulatory and accounting guidelines. Moreover, the PBGC (Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation) is available as a vehicle to insure bankrupt plans.  Theories 
regarding corporate DB pension fund management include risk management (Rauh 
2009), risk shifting (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977), tax benefit (Black 1980; Tepper 1981), 
and earnings management (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 2006). In general, except for 
risk management and risk shifting, these are not the research issues associated with public 
DB plans. In this section we discuss potential hypotheses for explaining public pension 
plan risk-taking behavior. We use pension plan asset beta or equity asset allocation 
percentage as a proxy for public pension plan risk, the dependent variable that will be 
used in the regression models.  Appendix A contains a summary of various hypotheses, 
related variables, and predicted signs for variable coefficients.  
3.1. Risk management  
Several recent articles describe the inadequacy of funding (for DB plans) and 
discuss the incentives state governments harbor that have led to the current high levels of 
underfunding (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009, 2010; Rauh 2010; Bonafede, Foresti, and 
Yang 2005). As a consequence of the underfunding, many states and municipalities are 
reducing services—that is, a greater percentage of their budget must be used for 
payments into pension funds. This evidence suggests that one incentive both private and 
public DB funds may have in common is risk management. Unexpected increases in 
required funding for pension contributions may reduce the ability to invest in capital 
expenditures because, in the short run, the state/municipal budget is fixed.  For states, 
                                                                                                                                                 
They support the 80 percent funding benchmark as acceptable for public plans. They argue that the true 
menace to state budgets is unfunded health care liability. 
11 During 2009, both CalSTRS (California State Teachers' Retirement System) and CalPERS announced a 
shift in investment policy. CalSTRS will shift some investment funding from stock to high-yield debt and 
underpriced assets being held by banks and expects to earn 15 percent on this category.  CalPERS loosened 
asset allocation and added new assets classes to include infrastructure, commodities, and timber, among 
others. 
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expenditures would be for schools, police, etc.  The implications are that, from a risk 
management perspective, states would prefer to have predictable pension contributions.12
3.2. Risk transfer   
 
Accordingly, asset allocation decisions would be a function of funding status: safe, well-
funded plans could invest in more risky securities, while underfunded plans would invest 
in less risky assets.  We use pension funding ratio to test the risk management hypothesis; 
we expect lower pension plan asset betas and lower equity allocations to be associated 
with lower levels of funding. We predict a positive coefficient for the pension funding 
ratio variable. 
Although the moral hazard (or risk transfer) issue is apparent for private DB 
pension plans, as they are insured by the PBGC, public plans may also be affected.13
                                                 
12 Indeed, one rationale for smoothing investment gains/losses is to provide more predictability of 
contributions.  Consequently, during severe market downturns, such as that experienced in 2008, the 
reported underfunding is underreported. 
 
Taxpayers are ultimately responsible for underfunded public pension plans. Early 
research on funding levels, such as Epple and Schipper (1981) or Inman (1981, 1982) 
suggests that underfunding is a method of passing current pension costs to future 
taxpayers. Presumably, the government can always raise taxes to fund pension plans.  
D’Arcy, Dulebohn, and Oh (1999) consider a theoretical model for state pensions and 
suggest that underfunding is not optimal, though, unless the growth in pension costs is 
less than the growth in the tax base. However, politicians are “are not concerned about 
long-term funding issues because they operate under a relatively short time horizon” 
(Giertz and Papke 2007, p. 314). If the risk transfer hypothesis holds, the predicted sign 
for the funding ratio is negative, as the severely underfunded pension funds would take 
on more risk. In addition to the pension funding ratio we also use the previous years’ 
investment return (i.e., 1-, 3-, and 5-year) to test the risk transfer incentive. Funds that 
experienced low returns in prior years may react by increasing risk in the current year; 
thus, the predicted sign for the investment return coefficient is negative.  
13 Theoretically, private DB pension plan sponsors have an incentive to invest in a maximum level of risky 
assets so that the put value of the PBGC insurance can be maximized (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977). The 
recent empirical evidence from Rauh (2009), however, does not support moral hazard issue.  
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3.3. Political influence 
Politics may play a role in pension fund investment policy. A typical board of 
trustees includes representatives of active and retired members, plus political 
appointees.14 Coronado, Engen, and Knight (2003) examine whether a government entity 
can invest money on behalf of employees in the same manner as a private pension fund.  
They suggest that conflicts of interest result in public fund returns lying below the 
risk/return frontier. After controlling for differences in asset allocation, they find 
evidence that plan asset returns are diminished by certain types of political interference. 
Illustrations of political influence include pressure to buy bonds issued by the state or 
local government or to direct funds to economically targeted investments (ETI).  The 
prominent CalPERS fund directs a portion of its portfolio to The California Initiative for 
private equity investment in businesses in underserved areas.15  As of 2007, 10.8 percent 
of the total CalPERS fund was invested in California.16 Nofsinger (1998) suggests that 
those funds investing in ETI experience lower returns compared to a benchmarked 
portfolio and that underfunded plans that use high actuarially assumed returns are more 
likely to invest in ETI. In contrast, Munnell and Sundèn (2001) argue that the amount of 
ETI is small, less than 2.5 percent of assets, and does not adversely affect return. These 
are early studies and include small sample sizes.  Over the past decade more states (21) 
have passed legislation allowing state pension funds to make targeted investments. In 
2008, the Florida legislature passed a bill that allowed state pension funds to invest up to 
1.5 percent of assets ($1.9 billion) in technology and high-growth investments that would 
create high-wage jobs for Florida.17
                                                 
14 Typically a board oversees the fund investment.  The STRS Ohio board includes seven teachers (five 
active teachers and two retired teachers) and four investment experts appointed by the governor, the 
speaker of the house, the senate president, and the superintendent of public instruction. The New Jersey 
pension system has three teachers, two governor appointments, one elected by the board, and one treasurer 
appointment.  
 We consider political influence to invest locally or to 
give consideration to social goals and include dummy variables if the state system 
15 This is from Hoffer  (2004), p. 8.  
16 From  CalPERS (2007), p. 4. 
17 OPPAGA (2008). A review of the Florida Growth Fund performance appears in OPPAGA Report No. 
10-60, The Florida Growth Fund Added Investments in 2010, but It Is Still Too Early to Assess Total 
Economic Impact.  According to the data in the report, $73 million was invested in 11 companies.  
Although some jobs were created, “the SBA does not expect to earn competitive rates of return on these 
investments for at least 8 to 10 years because such investments typically involve relatively young or start-
up companies” (p. 3).  
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supports economically targeted investments. The predictive sign for the dummy 
coefficient is positive.  If, because of political influence, the plan administrators make 
investments below the risk/return frontier, the remaining assets may be invested in riskier 
securities, resulting in a higher plan beta or a larger percentage of equity allocation. 
3.4.  Fiscal constraints  
When states are constrained from issuing additional debt, underfunding pension 
funds may substitute for borrowing (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009).  There is some 
evidence that fiscal constraints do affect public pension plans. According to Eaton and 
Nofsinger (2004), fiscal constraints cause states to manipulate actuarial assumptions to 
lower required contribution. And, because states can justify a higher discount rate for 
liabilities through the assumed rate of return, states facing financial constraints may 
subsequently invest in riskier assets, resulting in higher pension plan betas or larger 
equity allocations, or both.  Proxy variables for state fiscal constraints include Moody’s 
state ratings for general obligation bonds and state net tax-supported debt as a percentage 
of personal income.18
3.5.  Accounting effect    
 According to the fiscal constraints hypothesis, states that have 
severe fiscal constraints (e.g., lower debt ratings and higher debt/personal income ratios) 
would be more likely to substitute pension underfunding for debt and to take more risk in 
their pension asset investment. We predict that the signs for the coefficients for state 
ratings (lower rating coded with higher numeric value) and debt-to-personal income ratio 
will be positive. We also use the percentage of actual employer contribution to annual 
required contributions as a third measure of state fiscal constraints, assuming that states 
with fiscal pressure are less likely to fully fund the yearly expense. We expect a negative 
coefficient for employer contribution percentage if financial constraints hypothesis holds. 
Public pension plans are regulated by GASB 25, which requires that the 
underfunding gap be amortized and results in an increase to the required annual 
contributions. The impact of amortizing the underfunding gap could be reduced by 
increasing the return assumption. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, administrators are 
allowed to discount liabilities at the assumed return. However, the pension plan may not 
                                                 
18 Both measures are obtained from Moody’s.  As one of the two key measures used by analysts to compare 
state debt burdens, net tax-supported debt refers to any debt “to which state resources are pledged for 
payment.” See Moody’s Investors Service (2010). Another measure is debt per capita. 
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subsequently achieve the higher return.  Indeed, Eaton and Nofsinger (2001) find that the 
return assumption is not correlated with the actual fund performance, whereas the 
percentage of the fund invested in equity is highly predictive of returns. Unless the fund 
increases its actual return, underfunding will continue to grow. 
Does the pension fund manager subsequently increase the allocation of funds to 
equity to justify the high return assumption?  Weller and Wenger (2009) do not find 
evidence that public fund managers chase returns when they are underfunded. It does 
appear, though, that funds are increasingly investing outside of the traditional debt/equity 
mix, possibly to increase realized returns. Robertson and Wielezynski (2008) consider the 
increase in asset allocation to alternative investments such as hedge funds, real estate, and 
private equity funds and report no significant differences in the Sharpe ratio between 
pension plans that invested in alternative assets and those that did not.  
These findings support Rauh’s (2010) conclusion that public DB pension funds 
are pursuing riskier investments. Park (2009) reports that public plan sponsors who use 
high discount rates are 3.6 percent more likely to invest in higher risk assets than those 
who use low discount rates.  High discount groups may use more alternative investments, 
but the same equity allocation. The accounting effect predicts a positive coefficient for 
the return assumption.  
3.6. Union effect 
Public employees represent a large voting bloc, and during the 1970s several 
states gave public employees the right to collective bargaining.19  Freeman (1983) reports 
that employees associated with unions receive better benefits, such as changes in the 
retirement factor and eligibility, early retirement without penalty, and increased COLAs. 
Increased benefits naturally result in higher pension obligations.20
                                                 
19 For example, The Dill Act in 1978 gave California public employees the right to collective bargaining. 
 Mitchell and Smith 
20 Current studies show that when compensation is viewed as a package, public employees are paid, on 
average, 3.7 percent less than private employees. However, Keefe (2010) acknowledges that retirement 
benefits account for a higher percentage of employee compensation: 8.1 percent for state and local 
employees versus 4.8 percent for larger private employers (more than 500 employees). When comparing 
defined benefit plans for private versus public employees, these are the salient differences: the factor 
applied to the final average salary, an average of 2 percent versus 1.5 percent; early retirement 
opportunities; and inflation-indexing of benefits (Munnell and Soto 2007).  A direct comparison between 
public and private retirement benefits is difficult, though, in that the defined benefit plan role for private 
companies is shrinking. (Companies are focusing on 401(k) plans because in these plans market risks are 
borne by the retiree, not the employer.) 
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(1994) find that greater unionization is associated with lower levels of pension funding. 
That is, the demand for more wages and benefits occurs at the expense of less funding. 
Concurrently, to cover the increased benefit expense, the investment policy, in terms of 
equity and other asset allocation, could shift.  For example, Proposition 21, passed by the 
California legislature in 1984, removed the percentage limitations on equity and 
alternative investments and simply required that the investments be “prudent,” i.e., 
exhibiting “the degree of care expected of a prudent person, who is knowledgeable in 
investments.”21
3.7.  Demographic effects  
  Our data include the percentage of public employees who are union 
members and the percentage of public employees who are covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. A positive coefficient for the percentage of union employees (and 
for the percentage covered by collective bargaining) supports the union effect. 
Age and gender of DB plan participants may affect the risk-taking behavior of the 
fund. Traditional portfolio theory expects risk-taking tolerance to decline with age.   We 
use (1) the ratio of active members to annuitants and (2) the average age of active 
employees as proxies for risk tolerance.  We expect higher active-to-retired ratios and a 
lower average age to be associated with higher levels of pension plan beta (equity 
allocations). Eaton and Nofsinger (2008) cite more female active participants in the plan 
as a primary factor associated with significantly lower funding ratios. Our data does not 
provide gender variables. But the type of plan (teachers, police, firemen, etc) is provided, 
and, traditionally, public school teachers are predominantly female.  The effect of gender 
on fund risk-taking behavior is ambiguous.  Some studies have documented that females 
are less likely to assume portfolio risk (e.g., Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List 2002). 
Conversely, the observation that plans with more female active participants have higher 
equity allocations or betas suggests that they may be more aggressive risk-takers. We use 
a dummy variable to indicate whether a pension plan is for teachers, police/firefighter, or 
the general public.  
                                                 
21 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned to change the pension system so that new 
employees would be covered by a 401(k)-style plan. However, the California state employees association 
effectively mobilized and successfully campaigned against the proposal. This example is from Byrnes 
(2005).     
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3.8.  Herding  
Herding is common among institutional investors. According to Park (2009), 
managers of public pension funds tend to follow peer group norms so that asset 
allocation-to-equity hovers at around 64–75 percent.  Pension fund managers, like other 
fund managers, have career concerns and tend not to deviate from peer group investments 
by holding nonconventional portfolios. Alternatively, public pension plan managers may 
mimic the top performers or pension funds considered to be large and influential, such as 
CalPERS.   
Similar to Weller and Wenger (2009), we construct several variables to test 
herding behavior in pension investment, including the top performer (winner) and 
CalPERS’s equity percentage and pension asset beta.  A positive and significant 
coefficient for the measures supports the herding effect.  
3.9.  Other effects  
Larger DB plans enjoy economies of scale for transaction fees. Accordingly, these 
plans may invest more in equity and alternative investments and have higher pension plan 
betas. We include the log of the plan size to test this effect. As mentioned by Eaton and 
Nofsinger (2004), other funding assumptions may be manipulated. We look at the 
amortization period for unfunded accumulated liability and project that funds that try to 
minimize the effect of losses by having a longer amortization period will take more 
investment risks.  
 
4. Data and variable construction 
The data required for this study include public pension plan asset allocation, 
funding ratios, plan asset returns, state government contributions and measures of fiscal 
constraints, public employee unionization, and plan demographics. The major data source 
is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College.22
                                                 
22 The PPD data are “collected from plans, annual reports, actuarial valuations, member handbooks, and 
contact with plan administrators” (Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 2011).  
 The data are available from fiscal years 2001 through 2009, covering 
126 pension systems for 50 states and the District of Columbia. These pension systems 
together held $2.09 trillion pension assets at the end of fiscal year 2009. Each state 
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administers at least one pension system, and each system has at least one pension plan.23
In regard to the state finance measures, we obtain the historical data on the state 
general obligation bond ratings and net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal 
income from Moody’s. The public employee union membership and coverage data are 
obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database.
 
State government typically establishes multiple pension plans within one pension system 
for different employee groups, such as teachers, police and firefighters, and state and 
local government employees. The full sample has 1,134 pension system-year 
observations from 2001 through 2009.  
24 In addition, some public 
pension funds have special investment policies or initiatives related with economically 
targeted investment (ETI), such as urban economic development policies. This 
information is obtained from the Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization Center, 
University of Oxford.25
We describe the construction of pension risk, funding ratios, and the investment 
herding measures in detail below and provide the definitions of other variables in 
Appendix B.  
  
4.1.  Pension risk 
The first measure of pension risk is the percentage of total plan assets invested in 
the equity market. The information is available in the Public Plans Database and reported 
at pension system level. An alternative measure is pension asset beta, which is first used 
by Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) as a measure of private pension plan asset risk. It is 
                                                 
23 The number of pension systems in each state ranges from one to six—California and Texas each have six 
pension systems. 84 pension systems (out of a total of 126) have one pension plan, with the rest having 
more than one pension plan. The number of pension plans for each state thus also varies, ranging from one 
to seven—Washington and Texas each have seven pension plans.  
24 The data are available at http://www.unionstats.com and are constructed by Barry Hirsch and David 
Macpherson based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly household survey (Hirsch and 
Macpherson 2003). 
25 The data on the ETI are only available for the fiscal years 2001 and 2003. In addition, we obtain the 
fiscal year 2008 ETI information from a research report conducted by the Office of Program Policy 
Analysis and Government Accountability of the State of Florida (OPPAGA 2008). This report lists 21 
states that made economically targeted investments using pension funds at the end of fiscal year 2008. We 
assume these states had an ETI allocation in the fiscal year 2009.  
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estimated as the weighted average beta of all asset classes in a pension plan’s total 
assets.26
 
 That is,  
PENSION_ASSET_BETA= 
1
n
i i
i
W β
=
×∑      ,                       (1) 
where Wi is the weight of each asset class and 
1
1
n
i
i
W
=
=∑ , and βi is the estimated beta of 
each asset. 27
 Public pension plans generally classify their pension assets into five categories—
1) equities, 2) fixed income, 3) real estate, 4) alternatives, and 5) cash and other assets. 
The weight of each asset class in the pension plan is obtained from the Public Plans 
Database. The betas for equities, fixed income, real estate, and cash equivalents asset 
classes are from Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006, Table 4, p. 9), as reported in Panel B of 
Table 1. According to the authors, these beta estimates for asset classes are drawn from a 
study by Harvard Management Company to determine the portfolio asset allocation. Note 
that Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) do not have the estimated beta of alternatives. The 
alternative investments of public pension plans generally refer to private equity 
investments, venture capital, and commodities.
 
28 Previous studies have reported various 
estimates of private equity beta. We assume a beta of 1.2 for the alternative asset class in 
this study. 29
                                                 
26 The Public Plans Database also reports actuarial pension assets. We do not use actuarial pension assets in 
calculating pension asset beta because the data report each asset category as the percentage of a pension 
system’s total market value, not as a percentage of pension actuarial assets. 
 
27 Beta measures the sensitivity of financial asset returns to the overall stock market change (i.e., using the 
S&P 500 Index as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative 
investments, including private equity, venture capital, hedge funds, and other alternative assets, while the 
use of the equity percentage could underestimate the true level of pension risk.  
28 For example, the Alternative Investment Management Program (AIM) of CalPERS had a total of $48.4 
billion in private equity investments as of March 31, 2010. According to a report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO 2010), the most popular alternative investments currently held by the public 
pension funds include private equity (venture capital and buyout), commodities, and hedge funds. 
29 The estimated betas of private equity include 1.10 (Ljungqvist and Richardson 2002), 0.6 (Hwang, 
Quigley, and Woodward 2005), 1.80 for venture capital and 0.66 for LBO (Kaplan and Schoar 2005), 1.7 
(Cochrane 2003), 1.48 (Phalippou and Zollo 2005) and 1.01 (Nielsen 2009). For commodities beta, we 
estimate the beta to be 0.77 using the S&P iShare GSCI Commodity Index from July 2006 to September 
2010, based on the in-sample regression and using the S&P 500 as the benchmark. It is generally believed 
that the alternative asset class has a beta greater than one. The beta of 1.2 is the simple average of the 
estimated betas mentioned above, which we believe is a conservative estimate of an alternative asset beta. 
Our results remain significant if we use other, higher beta values for the alternative asset class. 
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4.2.  Funding ratios 
 Pension funding ratio is defined as the ratio of pension assets over pension 
liabilities.  As pension assets and liabilities can be measured by both actuarial value and 
economic (market) value, we estimate actuarial and economic funding ratio, respectively. 
In particular,    
   FUND_RATIO _ACTUARIAL= ACTUARIAL PENSION ASSETS
ACTUARIAL PENSION LIABILITIES            (2a)     ;                                    
 
   FUND_RATIO_ ECONOMIC= MARKET VALUE OF PENSION ASSETS
MARKET VALUE OF PENSION LIABILITIES  (2b)    .
 
Both actuarial value and market value of pension plans are available in the Public 
Plans Database. In measuring pension liabilities, the key difference between the actuarial 
and the economic pension liabilities is the discount rate used to estimate the present value 
of total pension liabilities. The expected rate of return of pension assets (in most cases, 8 
percent) is used as the discount rate to estimate actuarial pension liabilities. This method 
is currently used by actuaries and pension sponsors. As previously discussed, Novy-Marx 
and Rauh (2010) contend that this method is not consistent with the risk level associated 
with public pension liabilities.30
Note that the pension asset allocation information and the market value of pension 
assets are reported at pension system level, while actuarial assets and actuarial liabilities 
are reported at pension plan level. In estimating actuarial pension funding ratio, we first 
aggregate actuarial pension assets and liabilities across pension plans to arrive at the 
actuarial pension assets and liabilities at system level, and then estimate pension funding 
ratio based on Equation (2a). When estimating economic pension funding ratios, as the 
economic pension liabilities estimated by Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) are at the state 
 They advocate the use of either Treasury rate or 
municipal bond yield as the appropriate discount factors in estimating public pension 
liabilities. We obtain the economic pension liabilities for 50 states (excluding the District 
of Columbia ) from Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, 2010). The measures are available only 
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009.  As a result, our measures of economic pension funding 
ratios are available for 2008 and 2009. 
                                                 
30 Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010, p. 1) contend that discounting liabilities in such a way “runs counter to the 
entire logic of financial economics: financial stream of payment should be discounted at a rate that reflects 
their risk (Modigliani and Miller 1958), and in particular their covariance with priced risks (Lintner 1965; 
Sharpe 1964; Treynor 1961).”  
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level, we first aggregate pension assets across systems to obtain the state-level pension 
assets, then we estimate economic funding ratios based on Equation (2b).     
4.3. Herding variable 
 We use several measures to examine pension plan sponsors’ herding behavior in 
making investments. In the spirit of Weller and Wenger (2009), to examine whether 
pension plan sponsors follow the top performer, we identify the “winner” as the pension 
plan with the highest annual investment returns year t. We look at the association 
between the winner and the rest of pension funds’ equity allocation and pension asset 
beta. Similarly, to examine whether plan sponsors follow other big and influential plans 
with a high profile, such as CalPERS, we examine the relation  between all other pension 
funds’ equity allocation and pension asset beta with CalPERS.  
4.4.  Other variables 
Other variables include pension plan return assumption, employer contributions as 
a percentage of annual required amount, measures of state government financial 
constraints and unionization, and measures related to plan demographics and features. 
We summarize the definitions of these variables in Appendix B.  
 
5.  Empirical Results    
5.1.  Descriptive statistics    
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all plans during the entire period for 
returns, funding ratios, demographic features, and other pension plan characteristics 
(Panel A), state finance and unionization results (Panel B), asset allocations and plan 
betas (Panel C), and restricted sample statistics for economic funding ratios (Panel D). 
Based on prior research we expect to find plans, on average, to be underfunded and to 
assume high investment returns with substantial equity allocations. Our sample statistics 
confirm prior results, as discussed below. 
The statistics in Panel A suggest that plans assume a high expected rate of return 
but, on average, fail to reach those expectations. The mean investment return assumption 
is 7.97 percent, with three-quarters of the observations higher than 7.80 percent. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation, at 0.44 percent, indicates that plans do not often 
change their assumed rate of return. In contrast to the assumed rate, the results for the 
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investment returns are much lower.  We provide the average one-, three- and five-year 
return results and determine that pension plans underperform their expectations in each 
case.  At best, using the five-year average investment return, the plans underperform the 
assumed rate of return by 2.54 percent. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the investment 
return assumption versus the actual five-year investment return from 2001 to 2009. Over 
the nine-year period, the funds suffered several disastrous returns compared to the 8 
percent benchmark. Preliminary analysis, therefore, supports prior findings that public 
pension funds are assuming unrealistic investment returns, which is contributing to the 
underfunding status in that contributions are based on the assumed return. And our 
descriptive data shows that funds were, on average, underfunded during 2001–2009. 
The mean actuarial funding ratio for 2001–2009 is 86.01 percent, with half of the 
observations lying within the range of 76.1 to 98.2 percent. The minimum (19.1 percent) 
and the maximum (147.7 percent) suggest high variability of pension funding status. 
Figure 2 illustrates that a major factor of underfunding status is the drop in pension 
assets’ market value. As the stock market fell sharply in late 2008 and early 2009, 
pension funds with large allocations of stocks would be more adversely affected.   Note 
that the average economic funding ratios shown in Panel D of Table 1, which are 
estimated based on the data for the period 2008–2009, are much smaller than actuarial 
funding ratios.  The lower funding ratios are a function of higher pension liabilities, a 
result caused by a more realistic discount factor reflecting the near certainty of retiree 
payments.  If the Treasury rate is used to discount liabilities, the funding ratio drops by 
half.   
As noted above, plans allocating a high percentage to equity are most affected by 
market corrections. And most funds do invest a majority of their assets in stocks. As 
shown in Panel C of Table 1, three-fourths of the sample observations have equity 
allocations of 51 percent or more. On average, more than 56 percent of a plan’s assets are 
allocated to equity, but the range (0 to 82 percent) and standard deviation (10.41 percent) 
are large. The average asset beta of 0.6564 (and range from 0.1638 to 0.9096) is 
consistent with the average asset allocations in that the maximum equity allocation is 
slightly more than 80 percent. In Figure 3, we provide a comparison of asset allocation 
and portfolio beta by year. Equity allocation peaked in 2004–2006 at 60 percent and then 
17 
 
declined to 50 percent during 2008 and 2009. Accordingly, portfolio beta follows a 
similar trend, but decreases less than the equity allocation.  We observe that the fixed 
income allocation is lower in the later part of the sample period, thus the reduced 
allocation to equity is matched more by increases in alternative investments than by debt. 
Although the average alternative allocation over the entire period is 2.85 percent, from 
Figure 3 we see that the 2009 allocation is closer to 5.51 percent (increased from 1.64 
percent in 2001). In summary, compared to the mean values for the total period, equity 
allocation is trending lower and fixed income allocation is relatively stable, but real estate 
and alternative investment allocation are higher. As expected, pension asset betas, as of 
2009, are close to the sample period average despite decreases in equity allocation due to 
the increased investment in alternatives.  
Factors that affect the underfunding problem include an aging workforce and state 
budget problems. First, underfunding requires the plan sponsor to increase contributions 
in order to diminish the gap. If a state faces financial constraints, then the increased 
contributions necessary to amortize the underfunding amount attenuates the financial 
crisis.  Panel B of Table 1 shows that some states do face fiscal pressures, as measured by 
state net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income or state credit ratings.  
The reported range for the sample is 0.0 to 12.1 percent, with one-fourth of our 
observations higher than 4.3 percent.  For comparison purposes, consider that the median 
debt percentage, as reported by Moody’s, was 2.1 percent in 2001 and 2.5 percent in 
2009.31
                                                 
31 From Moody’s Investors Service (2010).  
 Additional signs of fiscal pressure may include the amortization period. And, 
although the median amortization period for underfunding is 29 years, the maximum 
observation is 40 years, and 25 percent of the observations exceed 30 years. Furthermore, 
underfunded plans are more alarming if the workforce is aging. Plan descriptive data 
from Panel A indicate an aging workforce because there are relatively few working 
employees (2.69) for each retiree. Additional supporting evidence of workforce age is the 
average age for active employees, nearly 45, with a standard deviation of just over 3 
years.  
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5.2.  Regression analysis 
5.2.1. Univariate results 
 Results from univariate regressions for both equity allocation (column 1) and 
pension asset beta (column 2) appear in Table 2. In general, the results are similar for 
both dependent variables and provide consistent support for the accounting effect, risk 
transfer, herding, fiscal constraint, and demographic and union effect hypotheses. In 
contrast, the results do not support the risk management or political influence hypotheses. 
We discuss the implications from these results below. 
Positive and significant coefficients for the return assumption support the 
accounting effect, which implies that a higher pension return assumption is associated 
with a larger equity allocation and pension asset beta.  Negative and significant 
coefficients for five of the six proxy variables (the economic funding ratio variables and 
the lagged three- and five-year return variables) support the risk transfer hypothesis. That 
is, managers take on more risk if the plan is underfunded and experienced poor 
investment returns in the previous three or five years.32
                                                 
32 The one-year lagged return provides a conflicting result. We will discuss this finding in the multivariate 
regression analysis.  
 The coefficients for state 
contribution as a percentage of annual required contributions, state debt ratings, and debt 
burden are all consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis.  In particular, pension 
funds contributing less relative to annual required contributions have higher equity 
allocations and pension asset betas. Similarly, pension funds sponsored by the states that 
have lower credit ratings and higher tax-supported debt have higher allocations of equity 
and higher betas. (We note that the coefficient for debt burden, although positive when 
beta is the dependent variable, is not significantly different from zero.) In addition, there 
appears to be a union effect, in that higher union membership percentages and a higher 
percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining are associated with more risk. 
Finally, strong results appear for the herding hypothesis using the CalPERS proxy: funds 
tend to follow CalPERS for equity allocation, and funds tend to mimic changes in 
CalPERS beta. On the other hand, the “winner” effect is significant for beta, but not for 
equity allocation. 
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Pension fund type falls into three categories, including teacher (32 percent), 
police/firefighter (8 percent), and general (60 percent).  As reported by Eaton and 
Nofsinger (2008), funds that have a higher percentage of females are more likely to be 
underfunded. Consequently, the underfunding may result in these plans adopting riskier 
investment policies. Traditionally, teacher funds have the highest proportion of women, 
and for our sample the dummy variable coefficient for teachers is positive and significant 
at the 1 percent level for equity and the 5 percent level for beta, indicating that, by our 
measure, this type of fund does have more risk. Conversely, the general fund dummy 
variable is negative and significant at the 5 percent level for equity and the 10 percent 
level for beta. We observe the insignificant coefficients for ETI in column 1, where the 
dependent variable is equity percentage, indicating a lack of support for the political 
influence hypothesis. On the other hand, we find that the coefficient for ETI is negative 
and significant when pension asset beta is used as a dependent variable (column 2). This 
result suggests that pension funds directing investment to ETI have significantly lower 
risk, as measured by portfolio beta, which we believe to be the appropriate risk measure 
for this variable. 
Univariate analysis provides a preliminary indication of a variable’s effect on risk, 
as measured by equity allocation or pension asset beta. In the next section we offer 
multivariate models that include proxy variables for each hypothesis, since risk may be 
affected by multiple factors. 
 
5.2.2.  Multivariate regression analysis  
In this section we discuss the results from a series of multivariate regression 
models that combine proxy variables for each hypothesis. We specify four models for the 
full sample that use a different combination of variables for those hypotheses supported 
in the univariate analysis. We specify multiple models employing different independent 
variables, because of the colinearity of proxy variables for each hypothesis. This allows 
us to check for robustness of the results. In addition, for each model, we report regression 
results for equity allocation and asset beta as the dependent variables. Full sample results 
are provided in Table 3.  
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In general, we interpret the results from the full sample regressions to be 
consistent with an accounting effect, to support risk transfer, and to suggest a tendency 
for funds to mimic (herd) the winner or influential (CalPERS) fund. Furthermore, there is 
some evidence indicating that a state’s fiscal environment affects the pension plan risk. In 
most cases, the sign and significance level for the coefficients are consistent when the 
regressions use either equity allocation percentage or pension asset beta as the dependent 
variable. The following analysis provides a more detailed review of the results. 
We observe consistent support for the accounting effect in that the coefficients for 
the return assumption are positive and significant for all model specifications. In 
particular, the coefficients for the return assumption for the equity allocation models 
range from to 1.722 to 4.5101, implying that a 100-basis-point increase in pension return 
assumption is associated with about a 1.72 to 4.51 percent increase in equity allocation.  
The corresponding increase in pension asset beta given the same increase in the return 
assumption is 0.0353 to 0.0627. If a fund assumes a higher rate of return, then the 
allocation to equity increases and, correspondingly, the pension asset beta also increases. 
The multiple regression results are consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. 
The coefficients for the lagged funding ratio and lag five-year returns are negative and 
significant in Models 1 and 4, suggesting that pension funds tend to take high investment 
risks when funding ratios are low and the previous-five-year investment returns are poor.  
When investment risk is measured as pension asset beta in Model 3, the coefficient is 
negative and significant for the lagged three-year return, supporting the risk transfer 
hypothesis. An inconsistent result is the positive and significant coefficient for the one-
year lagged investment return for both equity and pension beta (Model 2), suggesting that 
the overall pension asset risk would be higher (lower) following a high (low) investment 
return in the prior year. This could be due to the change of portfolio weights—after a 
good (bad) year, pension funds could tilt towards more (less) equity, thus the change of 
portfolio allocation is merely an artifact of the market value of stocks in a good (or bad) 
year.  
If fiscal constraints affect risk-taking behavior, we would expect states with high 
debt burdens and lower debt ratings to make riskier portfolio decisions. The regression 
results are consistent with this hypothesis.  The coefficients for state credit ratings (Model 
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1) are significant at the 1 percent levels. As we define increasing credit risk with higher 
scores, this result indicates that states with higher credit risk have riskier pension funds. 
In Model 2, the coefficient for the DEBT_INCOME variable is positive and significant at 
the 5 percent level for the equity allocation model, suggesting that higher state debt 
burdens result in higher equity allocations. Finally, in Models 3 and 4, the negative and 
significant coefficients for EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION, which is employer 
contributions as a percentage of annual required contributions, indicates that employers 
paying a lower percentage of the required contribution have higher allocations to equity. 
These regression results suggest that states are substituting increased pension 
underfunding for borrowing when they face fiscal constraints, consistent with the fiscal 
constraint hypothesis. 
The independent variables CALPERS_EQUITIES and WINNER_EQUITIES 
measure the previous year’s equity allocation and are used to test the herding effect. 
Across all models, the positive and significant coefficient for CALPERS_EQUTIES 
indicates that pension funds indeed follow the investment strategy of high-profile plans 
such as CalPERS. There is also some evidence that pension funds chase winners in their 
investment, as shown in Model 2 when using pension asset beta as the dependent 
variable.  Similar results appear when using the beta change of CalPERS and winner as 
measures for herding. The positive and significant coefficients suggest that funds mimic 
changes in beta reported by influential pension funds.  
Other variables, although significant in the univariate analysis, have mixed results 
in the multivariate analysis. Results on the union effect are mixed, in that the only 
significant coefficient appears in Model 1 for the beta specification, indicating higher 
union membership results in higher asset betas. However, there appears to be no effect 
when using equity allocation as a measure of investment risk, as evidenced by the 
insignificant coefficients for the percentage of public employees who are union members 
and the percentage of employees who are covered by a collective barging agreement. 
Higher ratios for active employees are associated with more risk for both equity (Models 
1 and 2) and beta specifications (Model 1),33
                                                 
33 Note that the coefficient for active to annuitant ratio in the univariate regression is negative. A further 
examination of the data shows that the inconsistent result could be due to data outliers. In particular, the 
 while a higher average age negatively 
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affects beta (Model 1) but not equity allocation. The fund size is consistently significant 
and positive for beta specifications and for equity allocation in Models 3 and 4. This may 
be due to the observation that larger funds allocate more to alternative investments, which 
would affect beta more than equity allocation. Larger funds could also be more likely to 
invest in alternative investments instead of fixed income. The plan type effect disappears 
in the multiple regression models. Eaton and Nofsinger (2008) find that teacher plans are 
more underfunded. A primary factor associated with such underfunding is the fact that 
more females are active participants in these plans. Therefore, the relatively high risk 
exposure of teacher pension plans could be related to their underfunding levels and is not 
necessarily an indication of high risk preference.  
Results and conclusions are similar when the sample is restricted to economic 
funding ratio and ETI data in Table 4. For Models 1 to 3, the sample period is fiscal years 
2001, 2003, 2008, and 2009, while the sample period is 2008 and 2009 for Models 4 and 
5 because of the data availability of ETI and economic funding ratios, respectively. 
Again, we run two sets of regressions, using either equity allocation or pension asset beta 
as the dependent variable. We observe support for the accounting effect in Models 1–3: 
higher return assumption is associated with higher allocations to equity and higher betas. 
The negative and significant coefficients for economic funding ratios (using either 
Treasury rate or municipal bond yield as a discount rate for pension liabilities) in Models 
4 and 5 are consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis, indicating that funds increase 
equity allocation or pension asset beta when they have lower funding ratios.  The 
coefficients of previous three- or five-year investment returns are negative and 
significant, which suggests that pension funds assume more risks following low 
investment returns, providing further evidence supporting the risk transfer hypothesis. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that funds with more active members are riskier. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is some evidence suggesting that ETI investing is 
associated with lower risk, in that the coefficients for ETI in Models 1–3 are significant 
and negative.  We also note that LOGSIZE in Model 5 (where the dependent variable is 
                                                                                                                                                 
active to annuitant ratios for the pension system of Washington School Employees and Teachers were 
31.59 from 2001 to 2004, much larger than the sample average ratio of 2.69 (see Panel A of Table 1). If we 
truncate the top ten percentile data and run the univariate regression again, we obtain the coefficient for 
active to annuitant ratio of 0.0179 (t = 2.44). Meantime, the multivariate regression result using this revised 
sample does not change significantly.  
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equity allocation) has a negative coefficient (significant at the 10 percent level), 
suggesting that the larger size of pension assets is associated with lower equity allocation. 
Again, this could be related to larger funds investing in higher levels of alternative 
assets.34
5.2.3.  Endogeneity issue 
  
 If equity allocation, the actuarial funding ratio, and the state rating are jointly 
determined, then OLS regression provides biased estimators.  In effect, there is a possible 
feedback effect between equities allocation and underfunding; that is, the causal effect 
could extend in both directions.  Furthermore, the same logic applies to the state rating 
and severe pension underfunding. As public pension plans are a contractual liability, 
lower pension funding could result in lower credit ratings. To account for the endogeneity 
issue, we construct a simultaneous set of regression equations for equity allocation, state 
ratings, and funding ratios.  We then use a two-stage procedure to estimate the model 
coefficients; those results appear in Table 5. In column 1, when the dependent variable is 
equity allocation, we continue to see that our results are consistent with those previously 
reported. In particular, there is a positive and significant coefficient for the return 
assumption, consistent with the accounting effect. A significant and negative coefficient 
for the funding ratio is consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Consistent with a 
herding effect, there is a positive and significant coefficient for CalPERS equity 
allocation. Finally, the coefficient for a state’s credit rating is positive and significant, 
consistent with the fiscal constraints hypothesis.   
 It is worth noting some other interesting findings when dependent variables are 
state credit ratings and actuarial pension funding ratios. As shown in column 2, lower 
funding ratios, heavy debt burden, and higher union membership are associated with 
lower credit ratings. The results in column 3 suggest that larger equity allocation is 
actually related to lower pension funding ratios. In addition, larger union membership, 
higher active to annuitants ratio, and younger workforce age are associated with better 
actuarial pension funding ratios.  
                                                 
34 This could also be due to the significantly reduced sample size, which has 53 observations for fiscal 
years 2008 and 2009.  
24 
 
5.2.4. Asset allocation in credit crisis period  
Our sample period extends through one of the largest market crises in 2008. We 
expect that the risk-taking behavior of public pension funds may differ between pre- and 
post-2008. In Table 6, we provide the preliminary findings on the public pension risk-
taking during credit crisis. In examining the mean and median for asset allocation 
categories, pension asset beta, and return assumption, we find a significant drop in 
equities and significant increases in real estate and alternative investments. Cash 
allocation, on average, increased by more than 3 percent. The significant drop in pension 
asset beta follows the allocation change, in that the beta for real estate and cash 
equivalents is less than that for equity. Overall, we observe that pension funds are taking 
less risk after the recent financial crisis.  
 
6. Conclusion  
During the period 2001–2009, the average actuarial funding ratio for public 
defined benefit plans was 86 percent, with a trend of decreased funding. Prior research 
suggests that public pension plans are underfunded because of public accounting rules 
that allow managers to assume high discount rates for relatively certain retiree payouts. 
Initially, this high discount rate reduces required contributions.  But, in reality, the 
liabilities are understated, and the plan may become severely underfunded on an 
economic basis. Consequently, plan managers could attempt to increase return and would 
hope to reduce the underfunding by investing in riskier assets.  But riskier assets are more 
volatile, and given the market downturns in 2008 and 2009, the funding ratio is slightly 
below 80 percent (as of 2009) and the aggregate market value of pension assets has fallen 
to near-2001 figures.  
An investment policy of increasing risk exposure on the asset side, while 
liabilities continue to increase with near certainty, can be a poor gamble. Why would 
managers play this game? One motivation might be political decisions to make certain 
investments. Another could be transferring funding shortfalls as tax burdens to future 
generations. In addition, bargaining by unions could result in higher benefits, accounting 
incentives tend to guide behavior, and states may feel pressure because of fiscal 
constraints. Yet another motivation may be a desire on the part of managers to mimic the 
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actions of the best fund or of other large funds.  Using proxy variables for these 
hypothesized effects, we look at the risk measures, as defined by allocation to equity and 
pension plan asset beta, for public plans from 2001 to 2009 and provide the first 
comprehensive analysis of public pension funding risk-taking behavior.  
Unlike reported results for private pension plans, results for public plans indicate 
that public fund managers appear to assume more risk if the plans are already 
underfunded.  This evidence is consistent with risk-transfer or with an intention to pass 
underfunded current pension obligations on to future taxpayers.  There is a degree of 
“follow the leader,” in that plan managers tend to follow the risk-investing behavior of 
successful pension fund managers. We find evidence to support the hypothesis that state 
and local fiscal constraints are associated with higher levels of pension fund risk.  
Furthermore, the results offer just mild support of a public union effect—that is, in order 
to provide for larger retirement benefits, the fund manager pursues a riskier investment 
allocation.  Ironically, it has been suggested that public employees accept lower pay, 
compared to the private sector, in exchange for job security and better benefits. Yet, 
higher promised retirement benefits are not consistently funded by state and local 
governments, and fund managers may take additional risks to compensate for the 
underfunding. The appropriate response by the employer may be to increase contributions 
to the fund instead of increasing the risk of the fund’s investment. 
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Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses, Treatment Variables and Expected Signs 
Hypothesis Treatment variable  (notation) 
Expected sign for treatment 
variable if dependent variable is 
  Pension asset beta 
Equity 
percentage 
Risk management 1) Lagged funding ratio—actuarial 
(LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL) + + 
 2) Lagged funding ratio—economic, using Treasury yield as a 
discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY) + + 
 3) Lagged funding ratio – economic, using muni bond yield as a discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS) + + 
 Risk transfer 1) Lagged funding ratio—actuarial 
(LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL) 
– – 
 2) Lagged funding ratio—economic, using Treasury yield as a 
discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY) 
– – 
 3) Lagged funding ratio—economic, using muni bond yield as a discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS) 
– – 
 4) Lagged 1-year pension fund investment returns (LAG_INVRETURN1YR) 
– – 
 5) Lagged 3-year pension fund investment returns (LAG_INVRETURN3YR) 
– – 
 6) Lagged 5-year pension fund investment returns (LAG_INVRETURN5YR) 
– – 
Political influence Economically targeted investment (ETI) dummy 
1) ETI + + 
Fiscal constraint 1) Moody’s state ratings for general obligation bond (RATING) + + 
 2) State net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income (DEBT_INCOME) 
+ + 
 3) Employer contribution as a percentage of annual required amount (EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION) 
– – 
 Accounting effect 1) Pension plan return assumption (RETURN_ASSUMPTION) + + 
 Union 1) Public employee union membership percentage 
(UNION_MEMBERSHIP_PCT) + + 
   2) Public employee covered by collective bargaining agreement 
% (BARGAIN_PCT) + + 
Demographic 1) Active to annuitant ratio (ACTIVE_ANNUITANT) + + 
 2) Average age of active employee (ACTIVE_AGE) + + 
  3) Teachers (dummy)—more female (TEACHERS) ? ? 
  4) Police or fire (dummy) (POLICEFIRE) ? ? 
 5) General (dummy) (GENERAL) ? ? 
Herding  1) CalPERS’s percentage of equity allocation 
(CALPERS_EQUITY) + + 
  2) CalPERS’s pension asset beta (CALPERS_BETA) + + 
 
 3) Top performer’s (winner) percentage of equity allocation 
(WINNER_EQUITY) + + 
 
4) Top performer’s (winner) pension asset beta 
(WINNER_BETA) + + 
Other 1) Log of pension system market value (LOGSIZE) + + 
 2) Amortization period (AMORTIZATION_PERIOD) + + 
Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
This table summarizes the variable definitions and data sources. The major data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained 
from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). In addition, we obtain the historical data on the state general 
obligation bond ratings and the net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income from Moody’s, and the public employee 
union membership and coverage from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. ETI data for years 2001 and 2003 are obtained 
from the Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization Center, University of Oxford. Data for the years 2008 and 2009 are from the Office 
of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability of the State of Florida.  
 
Variable notation Definition Data source 
EQUITIES The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the equity market. Public Plans Database 
PENSION_ASSET_BETA Pension asset beta is estimated as the weighted average beta of all asset 
classes in a pension fund, as in Equation (1). 
Public Plans Database; 
Jin, Merton, and Bodie 
(2006, Table 4) 
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL Pension plan actuarial funding ratio is estimated as the ratio of actuarial 
pension assets over actuarial pension liabilities, as in Equation (2a). Actuarial 
pension liabilities are estimated using the expected rate of return on plan 
assets as a discount factor.  
Public Plans Database 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARI
AL 
Previous year’s pension plan actuarial funding ratio Public Plans Database 
FUND_RATIO_ECONOMIC 
FUND_RATIO_TREASURY 
FUND_RATIO_MUNIS 
Pension plan economic funding ratio, as in Equation (2b), is estimated as the 
ratio of the market value of pension assets over the market value of pension 
liabilities, where the market value of pension liabilities is estimated using 
Treasury bond yield or state municipal bond yield as a discount factor. We 
obtain pension economic liabilities for year 2008 and 2009 from Novy-Marx 
and Rauh (2009, 2010).   
Public Plans Database; 
Novy-Marx and Rauh 
(2009, 2010) tables 
LAG_ 
FUND_RATIO_TREASURY 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS 
Previous year’s pension-plan economic funding ratio using Treasury 
rate/municipal bond yield as a discount rate for pension liabilities 
Public Plans Database; 
Novy-Marx and Rauh 
(2009, 2010) tables 
RETURN_ASSUMPTION The expected rate of return on pension plan assets Public Plans Database  
INVRETURN1YR 1-year investment returns of total pension assets Public Plans Database  
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INVRETURN3YR 3-year investment returns of total pension assets Public Plans Database 
INVRETURN5YR 5-year investment returns of total pension assets Public Plans Database 
LAG_INVRETURN1YR Previous 1-year investment returns of total pension assets Public Plans Database  
LAG_INVRETURN3YR Previous 3-year investment returns of total pension assets Public Plans Database  
LAG_INVRETURN5YR Previous 5-year investment returns of total pension assets Public Plans Database  
ETI A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan has economically targeted 
investment and/or urban revitalization investment policy; zero otherwise. 
Pension Funds and 
Urban Revitalization 
Web site, University of 
Oxford; State of 
Florida research report 
RATING A state credit rating for its general obligation bond. We convert the letter 
rating to numerical value as follows (larger number indicates higher credit 
risk):  
Aaa=1; Aa1=3; Aa2=5; Aa3=7; A1=9; A2=11; Baa1=13; with large number 
indicating high credit risk or strong fiscal constraint.  
Moody’s 
DEBT_INCOME A state net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income Moody’s 
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION Employer contribution as a percentage of annual required contribution Public Plans Database  
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT The percentage of  state public employees that is unionized Union Membership and 
Coverage Database 
BARGAIN_PCT The percentage of state public employees that is covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement 
Union Membership and 
Coverage Database 
CALPERS_EQUITIES CalPERS’s equity asset allocation Public Plans Database 
WINNER_EQUITIES Pension funds top performer’s (winner) equity asset allocation, where the 
winner is defined as the pension plan with the highest annual investment 
return  
Public Plans Database 
CALPERS_BETA CalPERS’s pension asset beta. Beta measures the sensitivity of financial asset 
returns to the overall stock market change (i.e., using the S&P 500 Index as a 
proxy. 
Public Plans Database 
and Jin, Merton, and 
Bodie (2006, Table 4) 
WINNER_BETA Pension funds top performer’s (winner) pension asset beta, where the winner 
is defined as the pension plan with the largest annual investment return. Beta 
Public Plans Database 
and Jin, Merton, and 
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measures the sensitivity of financial asset returns to the overall stock market 
change (i.e., using the S&P 500 Index as a proxy. 
Bodie (2006, Table 4) 
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT The ratio of active employees over annuitants of a pension plan Public Plans Database 
TEACHERS A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan is a teachers’ plan, and 0 
otherwise. 
Public Plans Database 
POLICEFIRE A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan is a police/firefighters plan, 
and 0 otherwise 
Public Plans Database 
GENERAL A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan is a general plan that covers 
public employees (excluding teachers and police/firefighters), and 0 
otherwise. 
Public Plans Database 
LOGSIZE Log of the market value of a pension system Public Plans Database 
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD The years of a pension plan’s amortization period Public Plans Database 
FIXED_INCOME The percentage of pension fund assets invested in fixed income Public Plans Database 
REAL_ESTATE The percentage of pension fund assets invested in real estate Public Plans Database 
ALTERNATIVES The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the alternatives Public Plans Database 
CASH_OTHER_ASSETS The percentage of pension fund assets invested in cash and other assets Public Plans Database 
DOMESTIC_EQUITIES The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the domestic equity market Public Plans Database 
INTL_EQUITIES The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the international equity 
market 
Public Plans Database 
DOMESTIC_FIXEDINCOME The percentage of pension fund assets invested in domestic fixed income Public Plans Database 
INTL_FIXEDINCOME The percentage of pension fund assets invested in international fixed income Public Plans Database 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of pension plan characteristics   
 Mean Std. Min. P25 Median P75 Max. N 
RETURN_ASSUMPTION 0.0797 0.0044 0.0450 0.0780 0.0800 0.0825 0.0900 1,112 
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL 0.8601 0.1629 0.1910 0.7610 0.8720 0.9820 1.4770 1,111 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL  0.8705 0.1611 0.1910 0.7759 0.8811 0.9940 1.4770 990 
INVRETURN1YR 0.0347 0.1166 –0.3802 –0.0490 0.0371 0.1270 0.2883 859 
INVRETURN3YR 0.0478 0.0610 –0.0916 0.0000 0.0450 0.1019 0.1790 857 
INVRETURN5YR 0.0543 0.0406 –0.0220 0.0250 0.0462 0.0877 0.1750 858 
LAG_INVRETURN1YR 0.0563 0.0967 –0.2890 –0.0240 0.0702 0.1336 0.2883 758 
LAG_INVRETURN3YR 0.0539 0.0597 –0.0901 0.0000 0.0500 0.1070 0.1790 756 
LAG_INVRETURN5YR 0.0561 0.0406 –0.0170 0.0260 0.0500 0.0890 0.1750 757 
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION 0.9251 0.3198 0.0000 0.8130 1.0000 1.0000 2.6300 1,134 
TEACHERS 0.3175 0.4657 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,134 
POLICEFIRE  0.0794 0.2704 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1,134 
GENERAL  0.6032 0.4895 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,134 
SMOOTHING_PERIOD 3.9927 2.1900 0.0000 1.0000 5.0000 5.0000 10.0000 1,096 
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD 25.7120 7.9549 0.0000 20.0000 29.0000 30.0000 40.0000 989 
ETI  0.4514 0.4983 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 350 
CALPERS_EQUITIES  0.5713 0.0559 0.4375 0.5656 0.5970 0.6078 0.6190 1,134 
WINNER_EQUITIES  0.4291 0.2431 0.0000 0.4653 0.4708 0.5840 0.7187 1,134 
CALPERS_BETA 0.7077 0.0302 0.6409 0.6963 0.7165 0.7283 0.7422 1,134 
WINNER_BETA 0.5297 0.2045 0.1708 0.5295 0.5680 0.6735 0.7781 1,134 
ACTIVE_AGE 44.7048 3.2673 34.4100 43.6000 44.6000 45.7000 60.0000 867 
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT 2.6891 3.8282 0.0387 1.6265 2.0144 2.5222 31.5900 1,119 
MKT_VALUE ($ bil.) 17.8034 27.4094 0.1799 3.6374 8.8014 18.7825 251.1227 1,132 
LOGSIZE 15.9353 1.2618 12.1003 15.1068 15.9904 16.7484 19.3415 1,132 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of state finance and unionization         
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT 0.3297 0.1759 0.0517 0.0517 0.2818 0.5010 0.7241 459 
BARGAIN_PCT 0.3746 0.1719 0.1038 0.1038 0.3298 0.5424 0.7484 459 
RATING 4.6511 2.5666 1.0000 1.0000 5.0000 7.0000 13.0000 407 
DEBT_INCOME 0.0301 0.0226 0.0000 0.0000 0.0240 0.0430 0.1210 450 
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Panel C: Summary statistics of pension plan asset allocation and pension asset beta 
 Mean Std. Min. P25 Median P75 Max. N Assumed Beta 
EQUITIES 0.5634 0.1041 0.0000 0.5100 0.5790 0.6300 0.8200 1,134 1.0000 
DOMESTIC_EQUITIES 0.3673 0.1468 0.0000 0.3210 0.4010 0.4575 0.7500 1,119 -- 
INTL_EQUITIES 0.1505 0.0720 0.0000 0.1180 0.1610 0.1990 0.3262 1,119 -- 
FIXED_INCOME 0.2884 0.1014 0.1000 0.2315 0.2700 0.3343 1.0000 1,134 0.1750 
DOMESTIC_FIXEDINCOME 0.1537 0.1630 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 0.2680 1.0000 1,092 -- 
INTL_FIXEDINCOME 0.0113 0.0258 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.1900 1,091 -- 
REAL_ESTATE 0.0534 0.0482 0.0000 0.0002 0.0500 0.0852 0.2840 1,134 0.1500 
ALTERNATIVES 0.0285 0.0506 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0440 0.4200 1,134 1.2000 
CASH_OTHER_ASSETS 0.0660 0.0626 0.0000 0.0130 0.0490 0.1050 0.3040 1,134 0.0060 
PENSION_ASSET_BETA 0.6564 0.0975 0.1638 0.6067 0.6708 0.7191 0.9096 1,134 -- 
 
Panel D: Summary statistics of restricted sample (2008/2009)          
 Mean Std. Min. P25 Median P75 Max. N 
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL 0.7976 0.1504 0.3910 0.7010 0.7920 0.9000 1.2800 245 
FUND_RATIO_TREASURY  0.3796 0.0901 0.2115 0.3030 0.3857 0.4402 0.5920 155 
FUND_RATIO_MUNIS  0.5782 0.1249 0.3419 0.4934 0.5608 0.6799 0.8333 155 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY  0.3566 0.0839 0.2115 0.2924 0.3517 0.4082 0.5305 58 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS 0.5833 0.1313 0.3419 0.4763 0.5741 0.6799 0.8333 58 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the major variables used in the study. Panel A provides summary statistics for pension plan return assumption, 
investment returns, employer contributions, and other plan characteristics, based on full sample from 2001 to 2009, except for the variable of ETI (a dummy 
variable indicating whether a pension plan makes economically targeted investments), which has a  sample period of 2001, 2003, 2008, and 2009. Panel B 
provides summary statistics for measures of state financial constraints and state unionization data. Panel C provides summary statistics of pension plan asset 
allocation and pension asset beta. Panel D provides pension funding ratios, based on a restricted sample of 2008 and 2009. The major data source is the Public 
Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). In addition, we obtain the historical data on the state general 
obligation bond ratings and the net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income from Moody’s, and we obtain the public employee union membership 
and coverage from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. ETI data for the years 2001 and 2003 are obtained from the Pension Funds and Urban 
Revitalization Center, University of Oxford, and ETI data for the years 2008 and 2009 are from the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability (OPPAGA) of the State of Florida. The betas for equities, fixed income, real estate, and cash equivalents asset classes in Panel C are from Jin, 
Merton, and Bodie (2006, Table 4, p. 9), and the beta for alternative assets is the author’s estimation. The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with 1,134 pension 
system-year observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia.  The variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B.   
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Table 2: Univariate Regression Analysis of Public Pension Risk-Taking Behavior, Using Equities or 
Pension Asset Beta as a Dependent Variable    
 Column 1  Column 2   
 EQUITIES  PENSION_ASSET_BETA   
RETURN_ASSUMPTION 
(N = 1,112) 
4.1811*** 
(4.55) 
 5.3763*** 
(5.91) 
  
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL 
(N = 990) 
–0.0140 
(-0.84) 
 –0.0284* 
(–1.76) 
  
LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY 
( N = 55, 58) 
–0.5123*** 
(–4.09) 
 –0.4719*** 
(–3.20) 
  
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS 
(N = 58) 
–0.2963*** 
(–3.88) 
 –0.3207*** 
(–3.51) 
  
LAG_INVRETURN1YR 
(N = 758) 
0.0788** 
(2.13) 
 0.0966*** 
(3.07) 
  
LAG_INVRETURN3YR 
(N = 756) 
–0.2695*** 
(–4.58) 
 –0.1433** 
(–2.53) 
  
LAG_INVRETURN5YR 
(N = 756) 
–0.8296*** 
(–9.63) 
 –0.5488*** 
(–6.35) 
  
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION 
(N = 1,134) 
–0.0210** 
(–2.33) 
 –0.0188** 
(–2.07) 
  
ETI 
(N = 350) 
–0.0158 
(–1.38) 
 –0.0236 
(–2.14) 
  
RATING 
(N = 1,107) 
0.0055*** 
(5.10) 
 0.0049*** 
(4.79) 
  
DEBT_INCOME 
(N = 1,107) 
0.1892** 
(2.38) 
 0.1752 
(1.38) 
  
UNION_MEMBERSHIP_PCT 
(N = 1,125) 
0.0458** 
(2.55) 
 0.0531*** 
(3.19) 
  
BARGAIN_PCT 
(N = 1,125) 
0.0484*** 
(2.59) 
 0.0515*** 
(3.00) 
  
CALPERS_EQUITIES 
(N = 1,134) 
0.5080*** 
(9.36) 
    
WINNER_EQUITIES 
(N = 1,134) 
–0.0016 
(–0.13) 
    
CALPERS_BETA 
(N = 1,134) 
  0.5677*** 
(5.92) 
  
WINNER_BETA 
(N = 1,134) 
  0.0335** 
(2.39) 
  
ACTIVE_AGE 
(N = 867) 
–0.0039*** 
(–3.56) 
 –0.0049*** 
(–4.65) 
  
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT 
(N = 1,119) 
–0.0032*** 
(–7.97) 
 –0.0048*** 
(–10.46) 
  
TEACHERS 
(N = 1,134) 
0.0213*** 
(3.60) 
 0.0146** 
(2.52) 
  
POLICEFIRE 
(N = 1,134) 
–0.0138 
(–1.00) 
 –0.0100 
(–0.96) 
  
GENERAL 
(N = 1,134) 
–0.0153** 
(–2.51) 
 –0.0101* 
(–1.78) 
  
LOGSIZE 
(N = 1,132) 
0.0070*** 
(3.17) 
 0.0116*** 
(5.72) 
  
SMOOTHING_PERIOD 
(N = 1,096) 
–0.0028 
(–1.53) 
 –0.0037** 
(–2.28 
  
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD 
(N = 989) 
0.0011*** 
(2.92) 
 0.0017** 
(2.92) 
  
This table reports the results of univariate regression analyses of public pension risk-taking behavior. The 
dependent variable is EQUITIES, or the percentage of pension fund assets invested in the equity market 
and pension asset beta (PENSION_ASSET_BETA). t-values are reported in parentheses, with the standard 
errors clustered at system-year level (Petersen 2009) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The full sample is 
from 2001 to 2009, with 1,134 pension system–year observations for 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. An exception is for the variable of ETI (a dummy variable indicating whether a pension plan 
makes economically targeted investments), which has a sample period of 2001, 2003, 2008, and 2009. N in 
the parenthesis shows the number of observations used for the univariate regression. The variable 
definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Public Pension Risk-Taking Behavior   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 EQUITIES PENSION_ ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA 
RETURN_ASSUMPTION 1.7220* 
(1.95) 
3.5279*** 
(4.17) 
4.5101*** 
(2.98) 
5.9580*** 
(3.84) 
4.3189*** 
(2.90) 
6.1668*** 
(4.05) 
4.4581*** 
(2.97) 
6.2724*** 
(4.10) 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL –0.0481** 
(–2.01) 
–0.0382** 
(–2.48) 
      
LAG_INVRETURN1YR   0.2009*** 
(6.78) 
0.1311*** 
(4.89) 
    
LAG_INVRETURN3YR     –0.1019 
(–1.54) 
–0.1433** 
(–2.01) 
  
LAG_INVRETURN5YR       –0.3207*** 
(–3.54) 
–0.3000*** 
(–3.62) 
RATING 0.0047*** 
(3.21) 
0.0022*** 
(2.61) 
      
DEBT_INCOME   0.3968** 
(2.40) 
0.1518 
(0.95) 
    
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION     –0.0247** 
(–1.99) 
–0.0138 
(–1.13) 
–0.0240* 
(–1.95) 
–0.0120 
(–0.98) 
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT 0.0340 
(1.39) 
0.0543*** 
(2.83) 
      
BARGAIN_PCT   0.0197 
(0.68) 
0.0149 
(0.58) 
0.0244 
(0.93) 
0.0150 
(0.66) 
0.0190 
(0.72) 
0.0109 
(0.48) 
CALPERS_EQUITIES 0.5054** 
(7.72) 
   0.5946*** 
(7.08) 
 0.5666*** 
(7.43) 
 
WINNER_EQUITIES   0.0110 
(0.71) 
     
CALPERS_BETA  0.4940*** 
(5.04) 
   0.8276*** 
(4.89) 
 0.7421*** 
(5.75) 
WINNER_BETA    0.0392** 
(2.35) 
    
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT 0.0208*** 
(4.80) 
0.0164*** 
(5.68) 
0.0188** 
(2.20) 
0.0061 
(0.80) 
0.0115 
(1.36) 
0.0033 
(0.45) 
0.0096 
(1.16) 
0.0017 
(0.23) 
ACTIVE_AGE –0.0009 
(–0.67) 
–0.0024*** 
(–4.39) 
      
TEACHERS 0.0101 
(1.27) 
–0.0067 
(–1.62) 
      
POLICEFIRE   0.0083 
(0.44) 
–0.0037 
(–0.27) 
    
GENERAL     –0.0068 
(–1.05) 
0.0094 
(1.55) 
–0.0076 
(–1.17) 
0.0088 
(1.44) 
LOGSIZE 0.0036 
(1.00) 
0.0090*** 
(5.17) 
0.0029 
(0.92) 
0.0109*** 
(3.66) 
0.0065** 
(2.12) 
0.0125*** 
(4.37) 
0.0073** 
(2.40) 
0.0131*** 
(4.62) 
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD 0.0009* 
(1.67) 
0.0016*** 
(3.99) 
0.0005 
(1.23) 
0.0007* 
(1.79) 
0.0004 
(0.97) 
0.0008** 
(2.26) 
0.0003 
(0.70) 
0.0007** 
(2.01) 
Adj. R2 0.1917 0.1839 0.0979 0.1214 0.1121 0.1273 0.1232 0.1369 
N 638 638 788 788 786 786 787 787 
This table reports the results of multivariate regression analyses of public pension risk-taking behavior. The 
dependent variables are equity allocation or pension asset beta.  t- values are reported in parentheses, with 
the standard errors clustered at system-year level (Petersen 2009) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The 
variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Public Pension Risk-Taking Behavior Based on a Restricted Sample 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 EQUITIES PENSION_ ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA EQUITIES 
PENSION_ 
ASSET_BETA 
RETURN_ASSUMPTION 6.3979** 
(2.18) 
6.2545** 
(2.00) 
6.4418** 
(2.15) 
6.2946* 
(1.98) 
6.999** 
(2.22) 
6.6449** 
(2.01) 
0.0095 
(0.01) 
5.0495 
(1.14) 
0.0451 
(0.01) 
4.6552 
(1.17) 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASYRT       –0.3310** 
(–2.19) 
–0.3855** 
(–2.04) 
  
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS         –
0.1823** 
(–2.03) 
–0.2854*** 
(–2.82) 
LAG_INVRETURN1YR –0.0105 
(–0.16) 
0.0028 
(0.05) 
        
LAG_INVRETURN3YR   –0.2454** 
(–2.08) 
–0.1520 
(–1.32) 
      
LAG_INVRETURN5YR     –0.5458*** 
(–3.31) 
–0.3553** 
(–2.18) 
    
ETI –0.0289* 
(–1.91) 
–0.0303** 
(–2.13) 
–0.0264* 
(–1.71) 
–0.0292** 
(–2.03) 
–0.0254* 
(–1.70) 
–0.0279** 
(–1.98) 
    
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT       0.0830 
(0.66) 
0.0230 
(0.37) 
0.0741 
(0.59) 
0.0270 
(0.35) 
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT       0.0601* 
(1.73) 
0.0598** 
(2.23) 
0.0649* 
(1.86) 
0.0650** 
(2.50) 
TEACHERS       0.0380 
(1.02) 
0.0021 
(0.08) 
0.0362 
(0.96) 
–0.0025 
(–0.09) 
LOGSIZE       –0.0302 
(–1.56) 
–0.0106 
(–0.70) 
–0.0334* 
(–1.74) 
–0.0123 
(–0.88) 
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD       0.0020 
(0.87) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.0023 
(0.95) 
0.0002 
(0.09) 
Adj. R2  0.0709 0.0780 0.0914 0.0884 0.1238 0.0962 0.2035 0.2376 0.1969 0.2781 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 53 53 53 53 
This table reports the results of multivariate regression analyses of public pension risk-taking behavior based on a restricted sample. That is, the sample period 
used for Models 1 to 3 is 2001, 2003, 2008 and 2009 because of the data availability of ETI. The sample period for Models 4 and 5 is 2008 and 2009 because of 
the data availability used to estimate economic pension funding ratios. The dependent variables are EQUITIES and PENSION_ASSET_BETA.  t- values are 
reported in parentheses, with the standard errors clustered at system-year level (Petersen 2009) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The variable definitions and 
data sources are summarized in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Simultaneous Regression Equations of Equity Allocation, State Credit Ratings, and Funding 
Ratios 
 
 Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
 Dependent variable: EQUITIES  
Dependent variable: 
RATING  
Dependent variable: 
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL 
RETURN_ASSUMPTION 1.8868* 
(1.75) 
 –21.1765 
(–0.64) 
 10.9721 
(1.12) 
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL –0.0792** 
(–2.12) 
    
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL   –2.8033*** 
(–2.84) 
  
EQUITIES   –3.9679 
(–0.92) 
 –7.5268*** 
(–3.35) 
LAG_INVRETURN3YR   –1.5639 
(–0.80) 
 –0.1462 
(–0.30) 
RATING 0.0057* 
(1.82) 
   0.0017 
(0.04) 
DEBT_INCOME   36.5359*** 
(4.56) 
 0.5350 
(0.25) 
UNION_MEMBERSHIP_PCT 0.0303 
(0.74) 
 3.7100*** 
(4.64) 
 0.5572** 
(1.99) 
CALPERS_EQUITIES 0.5089*** 
(6.84) 
    
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT 0.0406*** 
(4.65) 
   0.3568*** 
(3.08) 
ACTIVE_AGE –0.0029 
(–1.55) 
   –0.0279* 
(–1.75) 
TEACHERS 0.0054 
(0.54) 
    
LOGSIZE 0.0021 
(0.47) 
    
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD –0.0006 
(–0.10) 
    
Adj R2 0.1617  0.1313  0.0149 
N 498  498  498 
This table reports the simultaneous regression results where the dependent variables are equity allocation, 
state credit ratings, and actuarial pension funding ratios.  t- values are reported in parentheses and adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. The variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix B.   ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6: Public Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Asset Betas during Credit Crisis 
Period 
This table compares the pension asset allocation, return assumption, and pension asset beta between pre- 
and postcrisis periods. A Wilcoxon two-sample test is used to compare the medians. The year 2009 is 
identified as credit crisis period.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 Precrisis (2001 to 2008)  Postcrisis (2009)  Difference (post – pre) 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
EQUITIES 0.5706 0.5830  0.5059 0.5224  –0.0647*** –0.0606*** 
FIXED_INCOME 0.2898 0.2720  0.2777 0.2670  –0.0121   –0.0050 
REAL_ESTATE 0.0521 0.0490  0.0642 0.0590    0.0121** 0.0100** 
ALTERNATIVES 0.0251 0.0000  0.0551 0.0233    0.0300*** 0.0233*** 
CASH_OTHER_ASSETS 0.0623 0.0440  0.0951 0.0810    0.0328*** 0.0370*** 
PENSION_ASSET_BETA 0.0066 0.6735  0.0063 0.6372  –0.0003*** –0.0363*** 
RETURN_ASSUMPTION 0.0798 0.0800  0.0794 0.0800  –0.0004     0.0000 
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Figure 1: The Average Pension Plan Assets Investment Return Assumption and 
Five-Year Actual Investment Returns from 2001 to 2009 
 
 
 
NOTE: This figure plots the annual average pension plan assets assumed investment returns and actual 
investment returns from 2001 and 2009. The data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011).  The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with 
1,134 pension system–year observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia.   
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Figure 2: The Aggregate Market Value of Pension Assets and Actuarial Funding 
Ratios from 2001 to 2009 
 
 
 
NOTE:  This figure plots the annual aggregate pension assets market value and actuarial funding ratios 
from 2001 and 2009. The right vertical axis shows aggregate pension asset market value (in $ bil) and the 
left shows the actuarial funding ratios. The data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011).  The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with 
1,134 pension system–year observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia.  The pension plan 
actuarial funding ratio is estimated as the ratio of actuarial pension assets over actuarial pension liabilities, 
as in Equation (2a).   
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Figure 3: The Annual Average Pension Assets Allocation and Asset Beta from 2001 
to 2009 
 
 
NOTE: This figure plots the annual average pension asset allocation and pension asset beta from 2001 and 
2009. The data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College (2011).  The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with 1,134 pension system–year 
observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia.  The right vertical axis shows the percentage of 
each asset class in the total fund assets, and the left shows pension asset beta. Pension asset beta is 
estimated as the weighted average beta of all asset classes in a pension fund, as in Equation (1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
